



Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program

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July 1, 1989—December 31, 1989



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February 1991

Report of the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration to
the United States Congress
pursuant to Section 315(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958

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16. Abstract The report includes an analysis of the current threat against civil aviation along with information regarding hijacking, attempts, security incidents, bomb threats, and passenger screening activity. It also summarizes ongoing activities to assure adequate protection of civil air commerce against hijacking/sabotage and related crimes, and other aspects of the Civil Aviation Security Program.					
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U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave. S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

MAR 12 1991

The Honorable Dan Quayle
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

This is the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period July 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989, and is submitted in accordance with Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended.

During this reporting period, the FAA continued implementing a series of changes and improvements to the civil aviation security program in response to the tragic bombing of Pan Am 103 on December 21, 1988. In August 1989, the FAA issued a new rule authorizing the Administrator to require the use of automated explosives detection systems to screen checked baggage on international flights at key airports. Additional FAA aviation security specialists were assigned overseas to increase FAA's assessment capabilities at foreign airports and to conduct liaison activities with foreign governments. The FAA continued its efforts with multilateral organizations to strengthen the aviation security standards applied throughout the international aviation system, with added emphasis on the screening of electronic devices and the "tagging" of explosive materials.


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On August 4, 1989, the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was created by Executive Order 12686. The Commission's report was issued on May 15, 1990, and many of its recommendations were subsequently incorporated into the


Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. The Department of Transportation is in the process of implementing the Act and has already adopted a significant number of the Commission's other recommendations.

This report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House.

Sincerely,


James B. Busey
Administrator

Enclosure



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U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

MAR 12 1991

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. B. Busey", written in a cursive style.

James B. Busey
Administrator

Enclosure

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Executive Summary

- ◆ This report covers the period July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1989.
- ◆ Over 535 million persons were processed through screening checkpoints at U.S. airports. There were 1,464 firearms and 10 explosive/incendiary devices detected, resulting in the arrest of 764 persons.
- ◆ Two foreign commercial aircraft were destroyed in flight by explosive devices. On September 19, a UTA DC-10 aircraft exploded and crashed into the Tenere Desert in Niger, with the loss of all 171 persons on board. On November 27, an Avianca Boeing 727 exploded and crashed in Colombia, killing all 107 persons on board.
- ◆ The FAA purchased six thermal neutron analysis (TNA) devices, the most advanced explosives detection system now available. One of these devices began screening luggage at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. A second device was installed at Miami International Airport.
- ◆ Worldwide, there were five hijacking incidents, all involving foreign air carriers. In the United States, while no hijackings of scheduled U.S. air carriers occurred, two general aviation aircraft were hijacked.
- ◆ Civil penalties totaling \$139,193 were assessed as the result of 509 investigations of alleged security violations by U.S. and foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals.
- ◆ New rules were issued concerning FAA security directives, use of automated explosives detection systems, and foreign air carrier security programs.
- ◆ FAA conducted 100 foreign airport assessments at 96 airports in 47 countries to determine the effectiveness of security measures implemented at these foreign airports.
- ◆ Additional FAA security specialists were assigned to key locations in Europe to perform assessment and liaison functions.
- ◆ Federal Air Marshal teams flew 3,795,000 nautical miles in identified sensitive areas of the world.
- ◆ A total of 385 foreign students received aviation security training through 10 FAA-sponsored training sessions.
- ◆ An Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was established to provide a forum for the exchange of views and information on civil aviation security within the Government and aviation industry.
- ◆ On August 4, 1989, the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was created to conduct a comprehensive review and appraisal of civil aviation security policies and procedures with particular reference to the destruction of Pan Am 103.

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I. Introduction

This 31st Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program is submitted pursuant to Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended. Section 315(a) requires that a semiannual report be submitted to Congress concerning the effectiveness of air carrier passenger screening procedures. This report covers the period July 1, 1989, to December 31, 1989.

During this reporting period, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted a vigorous and comprehensive review of its aviation security program. This report details the operational and technological initiatives being taken to thwart the use of explosives in criminal acts against civil aviation.

On December 21, 1988, an explosive device was detonated aboard Pan American Flight 103 en route from London to New York resulting in the deaths of all persons on board and 11 persons on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. As a result of this tragedy, the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was formed on August 4, 1989, by Executive Order 12686. The Commission's objective was to conduct a comprehensive study and appraisal of the practices and policy options to prevent terrorist acts against civil aviation, with particular reference to the destruction of Pan American Flight 103. During the reporting period, Commission hearings were held on November 17 and December 18, 1989.

Section II of the Semiannual Report to Congress provides an overview of current aviation security policy, including a description of the system of shared responsibilities among air carriers, airports, the Government, and the airline passenger community. This section also discusses FAA's compliance and enforcement activities as well as recent policy initiatives, including the adoption of new security rules and the assignment of additional FAA security specialists overseas.

Section III of the report discusses aviation security incidents that occurred during the second half of 1989. These include the use of explosives against civil aviation and the hijacking of U.S. and foreign air carrier aircraft.

Section IV provides an overview of the major FAA aviation security domestic programs and activities. A discussion is provided on the nationwide effectiveness of the procedures used to screen passengers and their carry-on items prior to boarding scheduled and public charter flights. Information is also included on FAA's Indirect Cargo Air Carrier Security Program, Hazardous Materials Program, Federal Air Marshal Program, and K-9 Explosives Detection Team Program. FAA activities in the research and development of automated detection equipment to screen passengers, baggage, and cargo for concealed deadly or dangerous weapons and explosives are discussed. Finally, a description of recent civil aviation security training activities is included.

Section V of the report discusses FAA's aviation security international programs and activities. A summary is included of FAA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program, under which FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security assesses the effectiveness of the security measures at certain foreign airports. Recent FAA technical assistance activities with foreign aviation security officials is covered. Finally, FAA's aviation security involvement with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the European Civil Aviation Conference is discussed.

Section VI concludes the semiannual report with an outlook on aviation security initiatives in the United States and overseas.

II. Aviation Security Policy

Basic Concept: Shared Responsibilities

The U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program operates under the concept of shared responsibilities among air carriers, airports, Federal, State, and local governments, and the airline passenger community. The spirit of cooperation that characterizes this mutually beneficial working relationship has been very helpful in making the system work well.

As depicted below, the FAA is responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations, policies, and procedures; identifying potential threats and appropriate countermeasures; and, in general, providing overall guidance for the safety of passengers, baggage, and cargo, and the safeguarding of aircraft. The air carriers bear the primary responsibility for providing screening of passengers and baggage. Airport operators are responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for providing local law enforcement support for airline and airport security measures.

Airline passengers, as the ultimate beneficiaries of the security program, pay for the costs of the program in a variety of ways. Some of the revenue from passengers' tickets is used by the airlines to pay for security as part of the costs of doing business. Also, on certain international flights, security surcharges help cover the additional cost of providing enhanced passenger security measures. Finally, revenue received from the 10 percent Federal excise tax on domestic passenger tickets and the \$6.00 international passenger departure fee helps fund security improvements at U.S. airports.

Civil Aviation Security Basic Policies

Program Element	Responsibility	Actions
FAA	Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identify and Analyze Threat• Prescribe Security Requirements• Coordinate Security Operations• Provide Technical Assistance• Adopt and Enforce Regulations
Air Carriers	Secure Travel	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maintain Responsive Security Programs• Screen Passengers, Carry-on Items• Secure Baggage, Cargo Procedures• Protect Aircraft
Airports	Secure Operating Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maintain Responsive Security Programs• Protect Air Operations Area• Provide Law Enforcement Support
Users	Program Costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Fund Security as Operating Cost of System

Civil Aviation Security Compliance and Enforcement Actions

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
U.S. AIR CARRIERS					
Warnings	426	439	489	791	158
Letters of Correction	101	156	140	124	51
Non-Enforcement Actions	39	79	107	214	215
Civil Penalties	42	83	160	196	42
Amount Assessed	\$105,296	\$122,221	\$340,850	\$296,735	\$95,518
Investigations Initiated	744	1230	1344	2130	1221
Investigations Closed	608	757	896	1,325	456
Investigations Pending	145	362	1,262	2,279	2579
FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS					
Warnings	11	8	17	31	12
Letters of Correction	3	13	9	30	3
Non-Enforcement Actions	4	6	5	4	2
Civil Penalties	0	0	2	1	2
Amount Assessed			\$26,000	\$1,800	\$11,500
Investigations Initiated	31	46	88	60	20
Investigations Closed	18	27	33	67	19
Investigations Pending	7	13	55	104	68
AIRPORTS					
Warnings	53	60	46	46	31
Letters of Correction	24	27	32	49	32
Non-Enforcement Actions	10	22	28	15	32
Civil Penalties	6	15	26	56	14
Amount Assessed	\$10,900	\$16,950	\$28,650	\$53,750	\$89,367
Investigations Initiated	115	200	235	348	322
Investigations Closed	93	124	132	166	109
Investigations Pending	25	58	258	451	595
INDIVIDUALS					
Administrative Corrections	2,450	1,430	2,158	1,044	242
Non-Enforcement Actions	171	238	264	245	221
Civil Penalties	278	391	449	618	185
Amount Assessed	\$80,705	\$129,292	\$183,770	\$258,218	\$104,496
Investigations Initiated	2861	2909	3089	2635	2507
Investigations Closed	2,899	2,059	2,871	1,907	648
Investigations Pending	508	813	3,360	3,701	4,590

Compliance And Enforcement

U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) require the adoption and implementation of security programs by airports and air carriers. These security programs contain security procedures which are designed to prevent or deter aircraft hijackings, sabotage, and related criminal acts. The security procedures are under constant review by the FAA and the aviation industry to ensure that effective measures are implemented to counter the ever-changing threat to civil aviation. Compliance and enforcement of FAR are accomplished through an FAA inspection process.

There are 119 U.S. scheduled and public charter air carriers that are required to adopt FAA-approved security programs. Each of these U.S. air carriers has adopted the Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP), which was developed by the FAA in consultation with the industry. This program requires each air carrier to implement the same standard security procedures. The FAA has the authority to amend the ACSSP when safety and the public interests are determined to be at risk in an emergency situation. During the period July 1, 1989, to December 31, 1989, two ACSSP amendments became effective. One concerned screening procedures for battery-operated or other electrical or electronic devices; the second concerned alternative security training programs for crewmembers.

There are 138 foreign scheduled and public charter air carriers that serve airports within the United States. Foreign air carriers are also required to adopt and use security programs, and U.S. regulations require foreign air carriers to submit security programs to the FAA for acceptance.

The 257 domestic and foreign scheduled and public charter air carriers serve over 400 airports within the United States. Each of these airports is required to adopt and use a security program that provides a secure operating environment for these air carriers. Airport security programs are designed to meet the threat to the specific airport. Of the 402 airports, 18 airports, designated category "X," have been determined by the FAA to have a need for increased oversight and implementation of special security requirements. This heightened level of security has been effected through changes to the FAA-approved airport security programs at these airports.

To monitor the implementation of the security measures at Category X airports and other major U.S. airports, increased inspection and reporting requirements have been established by the FAA. In June of 1988, FAA implemented a Civil Aviation Security National Airport Inspection Program (CASNAIP) for special, in-depth inspections of these major airports and inspections/reviews of air carriers that operate from those airports. CASNAIP inspections identify problem areas, determine their causes, develop recommendations for corrective actions, and provide appropriate followup actions to ensure that the actions taken achieve their desired results. During the period July 1, 1989, to December 31, 1989, five CASNAIP inspections were conducted at Cleveland, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Las Vegas, Miami and Los Angeles.

While striving to achieve compliance through cooperation, the FAA must ensure that personnel of the air carriers, airports, and other organizations properly comply with the FAR and applicable security programs. FAA civil aviation security special agents inspect the aviation industry's security operations on a regularly scheduled basis and at unscheduled intervals. During these inspections, weaknesses and deficiencies are corrected, security violations are identified, and, if necessary, enforcement action is initiated. These actions may take the form of administrative actions (warnings or letters of correction), certificate revocation, civil penalties, or criminal prosecution.

During this reporting period, 509 investigations of alleged security violations by U.S. and foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were closed. In 71 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$139,193 were assessed. In 207 cases, administrative actions were taken. Alleged violations were not substantiated in 231 cases.

Data on civil aviation security compliance and enforcement actions from 1985 to 1989 are included in the table on the preceding page.

New Policy Initiatives

During this reporting period, the FAA continued to implement policies and procedures to improve security in response to the increased threat directed against civil aviation. Major new initiatives included the following:

- ◆ A new regulatory requirement became effective July 6, 1989, that requires air carriers to comply with countermeasures prescribed in security directives issued by FAA in response to threat information. This new regulation requires that carriers acknowledge receipt of directives within 24 hours and submit to FAA within 72 hours specific information on how they plan to carry out preventive measures.
- ◆ In September 1989, the FAA established a rule outlining regulations that would eventually require the use of Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) to screen checked (not carry-on) baggage in many airports serving U.S. carriers. In this rule, the FAA Administrator was given the option of implementation at his discretion. The FAA is currently assessing viable EDS technologies.
- ◆ The FAA purchased six thermal neutron analysis (TNA) explosives detection devices to demonstrate this technology in an operating airport environment. The TNA device is the only operational explosives detection system now available. During this reporting period, one of these devices began screening baggage at John F. Kennedy International Airport, and a second was delivered to Miami International Airport for installation.
- ◆ Additional FAA aviation security specialists were assigned to overseas locations, including London, Brussels, and Frankfurt, to increase FAA's assessment capabilities at foreign airports and to conduct liaison activities with foreign governments. Liaison activities have included discussions with foreign governments on new procedures for more effective coordination of security information and countermeasures.

An Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was established on October 10, 1989. This committee, which is open to the public, provides a key forum for the exchange of views and information on civil aviation security, with the aim of providing recommendations for the improvement of methods, equipment, and procedures to ensure the highest degree of safety possible for the traveling public. The committee's membership represents a wide range of government and aviation industry expertise in matters of aviation safety and security as well as representatives from the public. The committee held meetings in October and December of 1989.

- ◆ A new rule was adopted in 1989 that requires foreign air carriers operating within the United States and at last points of departure to the United States to adopt and use security programs acceptable to the FAA Administrator. Foreign carriers were required to have adopted such an acceptable program not later than September 14, 1989. Special provisions have been established in those instances when government authorities, rather than the foreign air carrier, are responsible for implementing security measures.
- ◆ Efforts to improve the screening of electronic devices in carry-on articles and checked baggage are continuing. The FAA has developed and disseminated to U.S. carriers a procedure to scrutinize closely all electronic devices that passengers bring on board a flight. This requirement significantly enhances previous security measures and increases the level of protection afforded the public while allowing the carriage of articles that are considered essential to many passengers.
- ◆ FAA is currently reviewing Parts 107 and 108 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, covering airport security and airplane operator security, respectively. This review is necessary to keep pace with the significant and rapid changes in aviation security methods, equipment, procedures, and policy. The major goal of the revision process is to delete information that is obsolete, to retain and update, in an enforceable format, information that continues to be applicable, and to look toward the future security needs of the aviation industry.

The FAA is considering additional aviation security steps, and will subject the U.S. aviation security system to a continuous and critical review. FAA will continue to consult with appropriate Congressional Committees, foreign countries both bilaterally and through the U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), all elements of the U.S. airline industry, and the user public. Where it is found that existing programs need to be changed, augmented, or redirected, FAA will not hesitate to do so.

III. Aviation Security Incidents

Use Of Explosives Against Aviation

During the period July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1989, there were no incidents of explosive devices detonated on board U.S. air carrier aircraft. However, two explosions occurred on foreign air carrier aircraft, which resulted in 278 deaths.

On September 19, 1989, a Union de Transports Aeries (UTA) DC-10 aircraft en route from Ndjamena, Chad, to Paris, France exploded and crashed into the Tenere Desert in Niger. The subsequent investigation by a joint international (Chad, France, Niger, and U.S.) accident investigation team revealed that the explosion was due to an improvised explosive device located in a baggage container in the forward baggage hold. The evidence indicated that the "bomb" was in a suitcase and contained a large enough explosive charge to overpressurize the aircraft fuselage beyond the breaking point. All 171 persons on board were killed, including the wife of the U.S. Ambassador to Chad.

On November 27, 1989, an Avianca Boeing 727 suffered a similar fate when an improvised explosive device exploded under a seat causing an uncontrollable in-flight fire and subsequent breakup of the aircraft. All 107 persons on board were killed.

Exhibit 1 depicts explosions on board U.S. and foreign air carrier aircraft and resulting casualties for the period 1983 to 1989. Exhibit 2 includes data on reported bomb threats against U.S. aircraft and airports for the same time period. It should be noted that the number of bomb threats reported to the FAA is subject to reporting error and that no clear relationship has been established between the number of bomb threats and actual use of explosives against aviation targets.




Exhibit 1




Exhibit 2

Aircraft Hijacking Incidents

Between July 1, 1989, and December 31, 1989, there were no hijackings of scheduled U.S. air carriers. During the same period, however, two general aviation aircraft were hijacked.

On August 18, two women chartered a helicopter from Helicopter Airways. Their stated purpose was to survey some real estate. After takeoff from Centennial Airport in La Junta, Colorado, the women drew pistols and forced the pilot to divert to Arkansas Valley Correction Facility in Ordway, Colorado. The helicopter briefly landed, picked up two prisoners, and then departed. The helicopter and pilot were found approximately 35 miles away from the correction facility. The pilot was not injured. The escaped prisoners and the two women were finally apprehended in Nebraska.

On October 4, a man walked into Connie Kalitta's Air Service at Willow Run Airport in Detroit, Michigan, and demanded that an aircraft fly him to Washington National Airport. The hijacker held a knife to Kalitta's throat as they walked on a ramp toward an aircraft. The hijacker was subdued by Michigan State Police.

As shown in the table on the following page, five foreign air carriers were hijacked during this reporting period. They involved an Air France flight on August 23; a Royal Air Maroc flight on September 19; a Myanmar (Burmese) Airways flight on October 6; an Air China flight (CAAC) on December 16; and a Saudia flight on December 31.

Exhibits 3 and 4 provide information on U.S. and foreign air carrier aircraft hijackings and prevented hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft from 1980 to 1989. Exhibit 5 includes information on U.S. general aviation aircraft hijackings from 1978 to 1989.

Foreign Air Carrier Aircraft Hijacking Summaries July 1—December 31, 1989

Date	Airline Flight	Number Aboard	Boarding Point	Destination/Objection	Remarks
August 23	Air France AF 2323	115	Paris, France	Tunis, Tunisia	Hijacker surrendered peacefully in Algeria.
September 19	Royal Air Maroc	8	El Aqun, Western Sahara	Las Palmas, Grand Canary Islands	Surrendered after negotiations.
October 6	Myanmar Airways UB 316	85	Mergui, Burma	Bangkok, Thailand	Surrendered to police at Utopa Naval Air Station.
December 16	Air China Flight 981	223	Beijing, PRC	Seoul, South Korea	Hijacker injured in Fukuoka
December 31	Saudia	Unknown	Jeddah, Saudi Arabia	Cyprus	Overpowered by security guards in Jeddah.

U.S. and Foreign Air Carrier Aircraft Hijackings

1980 - 1989




Exhibit 3




Exhibit 4




Exhibit 5

IV. Domestic Programs and Activities

Passenger Screening

Mandatory security screening procedures, which include inspection of all passengers and their carry-on items, have been in effect since 1973. In December 1987, the FAA adopted a tough new policy for assessing civil penalties against air carriers who failed to detect FAA simulated weapons and explosive devices. This new FAA policy calls for mandatory civil penalties of \$1,000 to \$10,000 depending on the circumstances. This enforcement policy was designed to focus attention on the necessity of improving the effectiveness of preboard passenger screeners. During the 6-month reporting period, nationwide screener efficiency, calculated by periodic screener testing by FAA using concealed weapons, improved to 92.89% from 91.71% during the first 6-months of 1989.

Passenger screening is carried out to prevent the carriage of firearms, explosives, incendiaries, and other deadly or dangerous weapons aboard air carrier aircraft. The FAA's analysis of screening checkpoint activity includes the identification of causes of screener failures to detect FAA test objects, including a review of training records, checkpoint operational design, and air carrier oversight. FAA works with the air carriers to channel the identification of these causal factors into efforts to improve the system.

Since the initiation of mandatory security screening procedures in 1973, over 11 billion persons and their carry-on items have been screened. This has resulted in the detection of over 45,600 firearms and more than 20,150 arrests. During the July 1, 1989, to December 31, 1989, reporting period, over 535 million persons were processed through screening checkpoints at U.S. airports resulting in the detection of 1,464 firearms. Of this total, 1,406 firearms were detected by X-ray inspection of carry-on items, 28 were detected by use of metal detectors, and 30 were detected as a result of physical searches. In addition, ten explosive/incendiary devices were discovered during this period including five grenades, three fireworks, one flare gun, and one tear gas device. There were 764 persons arrested at screening points for the unauthorized carriage of firearms or explosive/incendiary devices.

Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results, 1985—1989

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
PERSONS SCREENED (Millions)	992.9	1055.3	1095.6	1054.9	1113.3
WEAPONS DETECTED:					
<i>Firearms</i>	2987	3241	3252	2773	2879
(1) <i>Handguns</i>	2823	2981	3012	2591	2397
(2) <i>Long guns</i>	90	146	99	74	92
(3) <i>Other</i>	74	114	141	108	390
<i>Explosive/incendiary devices</i>	12	11	14	11	26
PERSONS ARRESTED:					
<i>For carriage of firearms/explosives</i>	1310	1415	1581	1493	1436
<i>For giving false information</i>	42	89	81	222	83

Source: Reports of passenger screening activities at U.S. airports.

Indirect Cargo Air Carrier Security

Indirect cargo air carriers (ICAC) are required under Part 109 of the FAR to adopt and carry out a security program approved by the FAA Administrator. This security program is intended to prevent and deter the unauthorized introduction of explosives and incendiaries into package cargo and mail tendered in air commerce. The exact percentage of cargo accepted by air carriers from ICAC rather than directly from originating shippers varies by geographic location. In some markets it may be as high as 60 percent. Shipments offered from a shipper directly to an air carrier, without the services of an ICAC, are subject to the air carriers own cargo acceptance security procedures. The FAA is now updating Part 109 of the FAR.

In order to determine the effectiveness of the Part 109 program, the FAA organized a task force to review completely the original rule, the applicable advisory circular, and the ICAC security program. During this process, two FAA/industry roundtable discussions were held at which the air cargo industry, including air carriers, small package air couriers, all major cargo carriers, and other industry groups were provided the opportunity to comment on how best to address cargo and mail security. The results of these discussions are being incorporated into the FAA's cargo security efforts.

On the subject of airmail security, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and its military counterpart, the Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA), maintain significant jurisdictional and practical control over domestic and international airmail carried by U.S. air carriers. The FAA is currently working with the USPS and the MPSA to review airmail security and screening issues.

Hazardous Materials Program

Increased amounts of hazardous materials are being shipped by air. Based on FAA surveys, it is estimated that approximately 3 1/2 to 5 percent of all cargo shipped in air transportation is comprised of hazardous materials. As a result of this significant quantity, increased emphasis is being directed to the hazardous materials compliance and enforcement program.

Hazardous materials inspection and surveillance activities are conducted by FAA civil aviation security special agents in conjunction with regularly scheduled security inspections of air carriers and airports. At a minimum, inspections are conducted of all air carriers, both U.S. and foreign, when it is determined that the air carrier (passenger or cargo) regularly accepts, transports, or handles hazardous materials. These inspections include a review and analysis of prior hazardous materials shipments, incident experience, identified or anticipated problem areas, and a history of violations.

In order to determine compliance effectiveness and ensure that freight forwarders and shippers meet their responsibilities in the shipment of hazardous materials by air, the FAA conducts inspections at the major air carrier facilities at large airports. These locations are collection points for shipments originating from many freight forwarders and shippers and are where these shipments generally first come under FAA jurisdiction. When the FAA determines that problems exist with a particular company, assistance can be directed to the identified problem areas.

During the current reporting period, the FAA evaluated and concurred with 72 Department of Transportation proposed exemptions affecting the transportation of hazardous materials by air and an additional four requests for emergency exemptions. Civil aviation security special agents participated in 12 Flight Standards National Aviation Safety Inspection Program inspections for the purpose of determining air carrier compliance with regulations governing air transportation of hazardous materials.

Since October 1988, the FAA has conducted hazardous materials inspections utilizing a new computer data base system. The data base system is designed to collect data at the field, regional, and national level. It contains information on airports, air carrier stations, and operators, as well as data on hazardous materials inspections and special agent training. The new system has provided an improved method of tracking hazardous materials shipments by specific air carriers/freight forwarders and identifying origination points of the shipments. This information provides the FAA with a management tool so that inspections and surveillance can be more effectively directed to those air carriers/freight forwarders who accept, offer, and transport hazardous materials and to the airport facilities where shipments originate. It also provides managers with a method of tracking all scheduled inspections within their respective areas.

In the following two tables, information is included on FAA hazardous material inspections and compliance/enforcement penalty actions from 1985 through 1989.

Civil Aviation Security Hazardous Materials Inspections/Surveillance

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
<i>Air Carrier Inspections</i>	3,863	3,441	5,001	5,988	5,298
<i>Freight Forwarder Inspections</i>	188	207	377	302	84
<i>Total Packages Inspected</i>	9,614	11,048	14,644	19,231	21,686
<i>Locations Inspected</i>	513	407	386	431	497
<i>Violations</i>	353	400	484	422	468

Civil Aviation Security Hazardous Materials Compliance and Enforcement Penalty Actions

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
<i>Criminal Cases Initiated*</i>	1	0	1	1	0
<i>Criminal Cases Completed</i>	1	0	1	0	0
<i>Total Fines/Years</i>	\$1,000	0	5 Yrs.**	0	0
<i>Civil Penalty Actions Initiated</i>	73	85	112	112	114
<i>Civil Penalty Actions Completed</i>	46	55	45	37	34
<i>Total Fines (\$)</i>	\$291,000	\$349,050	\$357,600	\$279,500	\$228,350

*If criminal cases cannot be supported by local U.S. attorneys, they are converted to civil penalty cases.

** Confinement

Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Program

The enactment of Public Law 99-83 established an explicit statutory basis for the FAA's FAM Program. This statute provided the Secretary of Transportation with the authority to authorize (with the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State) civil aviation FAM's to carry firearms and to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony.

FAM's are recruited as civil aviation security special agents. When not on FAM missions, they perform the same wide variety of civil aviation security functions as other security personnel. However, as FAM's, they receive intensive, highly specialized law enforcement training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), followed by recurrent training every 6 months. During this reporting period, one basic and seven in-service classes were conducted at the FLETC training site located at Marana, Arizona.

During the reporting period, FAM's provided security on selected flights operating in especially sensitive areas of the world, covering over 3,795,000 nautical miles. The missions, all flown with U.S. air carriers, were selected based on analysis of worldwide terrorist activities. Since civil aviation continues to represent an attractive target to terrorists, FAM's will continue to provide a very effective in-flight security countermeasure.

FAA K-9 Explosives Detection Team Program

The FAA K-9 Explosives Detection Team Program was implemented in 1972. Currently, there are 31 local law enforcement organizations participating in this program. Each jurisdiction must agree to establish two teams (each team consists of one dog and one handler) in order to participate. The FAA will provide logistical and training support to as many as five teams for each participating organization.

The U.S. Air Force, through a reimbursable agreement with the FAA, provides initial training at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. The Air Force also provides followup evaluations and refresher explosives detection training for civilian law enforcement officers and K-9 dogs.

All teams assigned to this program must be familiar with aircraft and automobile search procedures, baggage and related containers, and air operations areas. Every team is evaluated at least once a year and must recertify or return to Lackland for additional training. Participants in this program have been dispatched to locations throughout the world where this type of specialized aviation explosives detection technical assistance is required.

The K-9 Explosives Detection Team Program continues to serve as a major defense against one of the main threats to safety in air travel, that of explosives and improvised explosive devices.

Research And Development

Since the inception of its Civil Aviation Security Research and Development Program in 1976, the FAA has focused its efforts on the development of automated detection equipment to screen passengers, baggage, and cargo for concealed deadly or dangerous weapons and explosives. This remains a priority objective. Significant progress has been made in this area through the use of advanced bulk and vapor detection techniques. However, terrorists' access to newer, low vapor-pressure sheet explosives presents a continuing challenge.

A review of the technologies available to detect explosives that could be carried on an aircraft by an individual quickly led FAA to the conclusion that the explosive could be detected by the characteristic vapor or "odor" that it emits. The major challenge has been the development of sensitive devices that can collect adequate samples from low vapor-pressure explosives, yet are selective enough to distinguish explosives from background vapors.

The FAA has conducted research to incorporate a vapor detector into a passenger screening portal suitable for airport use. The portal uses large amounts of air to sweep vapors from passengers into the collector. Airport testing of a prototype unit was conducted on over 2,000 passengers. False alarms were less than one percent; however, the processing speed needs improvement to attain the goal of 10 or more passengers per minute. The FAA continues to work with a contractor to increase both sensitivity and processing speed.

The detection of explosives in checked baggage is a difficult problem complicated by the extraordinary variety of objects in passenger luggage and the diversity of the explosives threat. The FAA has been performing research and development on this problem for the past 11 years. Efforts have been accelerated since 1985, leading to the airport testing of two prototype thermal neutron analysis (TNA) systems beginning in May 1987.

Airport testing of checked baggage by the two TNA devices was performed at San Francisco and Los Angeles International Airports on a mixture of domestic and international bags. Over 40,000 pieces of checked baggage were examined and the results were very favorable. All decisions relating to the detection of the explosive stimulants within the luggage were made by the computer. There is no human decisionmaking or interpretation involved in the detection process. In response to the continued threat to U.S. air carriers, the FAA has taken action to acquire six TNA systems and place them at gateway airports in the U.S. and overseas.

The first TNA system was deployed operationally at John F. Kennedy International Airport in September 1989. During the reporting period, it successfully examined over 30,000 international bags. Additional TNA deployments were scheduled for Miami International Airport, London Gatwick, and Dulles International Airport.

The FAA continues to examine new concepts and technologies that may provide explosives detection systems that are more effective, less complex, and less costly than those currently under development. Because such efforts are high risk and long term, FAA's strategy is to increase the number and technical quality of new concepts investigated. The FAA advertised this requirement through the procurement process in fiscal years 1985 through 1989. Approximately 20 proposals were evaluated in each of these years. Technologies which employ high-energy physics approaches to detect explosives in baggage and cargo were funded. Also funded were several alternative vapor collection and detection techniques which promise to be more sensitive or efficient than techniques produced in earlier research and development efforts. In October 1989, the FAA published a Broad Agency Announcement summarizing its requirements.

In the FAA's concourse security program, emphasis has been placed on screening people. The FAA is currently directing research to improve the operation of existing metal detector technology. The objective of this development effort has been to improve hardware design and signal processing to reduce false alarms while retaining detection of the smallest handguns.

The FAA has also focused research energy and resources on the unique problems posed by nonmetallic weapons. Two new detection approaches that use microwave immersion technology are currently being investigated. Studies are ongoing to assess the efficiency of these approaches for detection of weapons, resolution, operational problems, processing speed, and potential false alarms. The FAA projects that it will have an operable system to evaluate concept feasibility of nonmetallic weapon detection during 1990. No nonmetallic weapons are reported in commercial production at this time.

There is an effort in the FAA's Research and Development Program to enhance and automate X-ray systems used in the screening of passenger carry-on items, while at the same time, several manufacturers are independently showing significant innovation in extending X-ray technology to identify specific threats. Studies are underway to improve concourse X-ray system performance by concentrating on the development of automatic pattern recognition software and hardware. Integrated into current X-ray detectors, automatic pattern recognition systems would alert the operator to suspicious items in luggage and graphically highlight the suspect item.

The FAA has funded a long-term contractual effort with Sandia National Laboratory to evaluate existing civil aviation security procedures and develop enhanced procedures to respond to an increased level of threat. Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI) has been chosen to be the test site for this project. BWI airport management, air carrier and industry representatives, FAA and law enforcement personnel, and Sandia staff have been meeting frequently to develop enhanced procedures and systems. Once in place, the enhanced measures will be evaluated over several months for effectiveness and operational impact. Findings will be used in the development of new security standards.

In conclusion, the FAA is aggressively approaching the problem of detecting the terrorists' tools, weapons, and explosives by focusing on detecting the fundamental properties of the threat. Mature technologies, like thermal neutron analysis, are being put into operational use. Other technologies are being pursued in anticipation of potential threats such as the nonmetallic handgun and a new systems approach to threat assessment and response. The goal of the FAA research program is to develop technology to fit into a total security system to deter and defeat threats against air transportation.

Civil Aviation Security Training

The FAA sponsors aviation security training programs at the Transportation Security Institute (TSI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, under the authority of Section 316(c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The current programs relating to aviation safety and security are administered by the Aviation Security Division (ASD) of TSI. Certain FAA-sponsored courses at TSI are mandatory for the FAA's special agents. In addition, local law enforcement officers, airport and air carrier managers, contract security personnel, state representatives, employees of other Federal agencies, and foreign aviation officials receive training in aviation security matters.

During the reporting period, ASD conducted a total of 18 classes of 8 FAA-sponsored courses/seminars. Domestically, the overall composition of the student body was: 130 FAA security personnel; 204 representatives of local governments; 9 representatives of state governments; 49 employees from other Federal agencies; and 187 industry representatives. A total of 18 international students representing 6 countries also attended the FAA-sponsored courses in Oklahoma City.

V. International Programs and Activities

Foreign Airport Assessment Program

Public Law 99-83, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, was enacted on August 8, 1985. Title V, Part B of the Act amends Section 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and directs the Secretary of Transportation to assess the effectiveness of security measures at those foreign airports being served by U.S. air carriers, those foreign airports from which foreign air carriers serve the United States, those foreign airports which pose a high risk of introducing danger to international travel, and at such other airports as the Secretary may deem appropriate. The FAA conducts foreign airport security assessments on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation in accordance with the provisions of the law.

At present, there are approximately 250 foreign airports that meet the assessment requirements of Public Law 99-83. This number fluctuates as changes in air carrier service take place at these airports. The number of FAA assessment visits to each foreign airport also is subject to change based on reviews and analyses of current resources and threat conditions.

Assessments consist of indepth analyses of the security measures at the airports visited, using a standard which is based, at a minimum, on the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. In the vast majority of airports assessed, FAA concludes that minimum standards are being met. In such cases, FAA may offer recommended additional security measures, which in most cases are immediately adopted by the foreign airport authorities.

If an FAA assessment indicates that an airport does not maintain and administer effective security measures, this information is reported to the Secretary of Transportation. If the Secretary determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and administer effective security measures, Public Law 99-83 provides for the notification of the foreign country involved. Notification includes recommended steps to remedy the problem. The law also specifies when and how the U.S. public is to be notified of the Secretary's determination. Public notice occurs when the foreign government fails to bring security measures up to the required standard within 90 days of being notified of the Secretary of Transportation's determination.

If the Secretary of Transportation at any time determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that a condition exists which threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from a specified airport, the Secretary of Transportation must immediately initiate the public notification procedures and, in addition, apprise the Secretary of State, who must issue a travel advisory. Under these circumstances, the Secretary of Transportation is also required to consider whether the public interest necessitates the immediate suspension of service between the United States and the specified airport.

During the period July 1, 1989, to December 31, 1989, FAA conducted 100 foreign airport assessments at 96 airports in 47 countries. As a result of these assessments, FAA made 112 security recommendations to foreign governments. Recommendations were made in the areas of: access control (49), airport administration (17), screening (17), airport emergency planning (12), national administration (8), baggage (7), law enforcement support (1), and cargo (1). (See Exhibit 6)

During the reporting period, one 90-day action was initiated by the Department of Transportation as the result of an FAA assessment conducted at an airport in Central America. The identified security deficiencies were corrected by the host government within the prescribed 90-day period.




Exhibit 6

International Technical Assistance

The Office of Civil Aviation Security provides technical assistance to numerous foreign nations in the areas of security training and security surveys of foreign airports.

Highlights of international technical assistance conducted during the reporting period are as follows:

- ◆ In-depth security briefings were held at FAA headquarters for 41 high-ranking foreign nationals representing Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Finland, France, Greece, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.
- ◆ 18 students representing 6 nations received FAA-sponsored aviation security training at the Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City.
- ◆ 367 security officials attended FAA-sponsored on-site security seminars conducted in Nassau, Bahamas (85), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (110), Caracas, Venezuela (85), and Trinidad and Tobago (87).

- ◆ FAA continued its coordination process with other interested government agencies, particularly the Department of State, in anticipation of security concerns surrounding the Olympic games scheduled for Barcelona, Spain, in 1992. Meetings are expected to be held with increasing frequency as the time of the games draws closer.
- ◆ In November, the FAA Director of Civil Aviation Security hosted a visit by a delegation of Soviet aviation security officials to continue bilateral discussions first initiated by FAA in 1986. Reviews were conducted of security procedures at airports in Washington, D.C., and New York.
- ◆ FAA civil aviation security representatives conducted briefings for a Japanese civil aviation delegation at the Department of State on the subject of international technical assistance initiatives in the Western Pacific.
- ◆ Civil aviation security specialists assisted the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP) in a crisis management course for a delegation from Cyprus.
- ◆ Two civil aviation security specialists conducted a security assessment of the airport in Amman, Jordan, in conjunction with representatives from the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP). One of these specialists, upon ATAP's request, will develop lesson plans on interline baggage security procedures, which will become part of the civil aviation security course taught by ATAP in Oklahoma City.
- ◆ Ongoing coordination continues between FAA civil aviation security representatives and the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. A large part of this coordination involves information pertaining to training and equipment needs being forwarded to ATAP upon receipt of foreign airport assessments, regional requests, etc.

Multilateral Organization Activities

The Federal Aviation Administration is an active participant in a number of multilateral organizations that deal with international aviation security issues. In coordination with the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, FAA works closely with these multilateral organizations to strengthen aviation security standards applied throughout the international aviation system and to develop cooperative strategies to deter criminal acts targeted against civil aviation.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

ICAO is the specialized agency in the United Nations system for civil aviation matters. Created in 1944, ICAO currently has 162 Member States. The basic aim of the organization is to ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation. ICAO's main technical accomplishment has been Member State agreement on the necessary level of standardization for the operation of safe, efficient, and regular air service.

In the aviation security area, ICAO has established a set of minimum security Standards and Recommended Practices, incorporated into Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention, that has been agreed to by most of ICAO's Member States. These Standards and Recommended Practices are being continually reviewed and updated, a process in which the FAA is directly involved. Special attention

has been focused recently on the screening of electric, electronic, and battery-operated devices and the need to keep a hijacked airplane on the ground.

Recent FAA activities with ICAO in the aviation security area include the following:

- ◆ On September 7, 1989, FAA Administrator James Busey signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) with ICAO for a joint project to provide FAA civil aviation security technical expertise to ICAO Member States. Under the terms of the MOC, FAA will arrange for the detailing of two FAA security specialists to ICAO for 2-year assignments, beginning in 1990. Activities of the specialists include providing advice and assistance to States, developing national, airport, and airline security programs, and conducting regional and sub-regional seminars.
- ◆ From September 19, 1989, through October 6, 1989, FAA representatives participated in the Triennial Session of the ICAO Assembly. During this session, the Assembly discussed the implementation of a resolution adopted in February 1989 setting forth a high priority plan of action to review and improve all existing aviation security international standards.
- ◆ In November of 1989, FAA participated in an ICAO meeting of an ad hoc group of technical specialists reviewing the marking of plastic and sheet explosives with chemical agents called "taggants." The potential list of 25 taggants was narrowed down to 3. The technical experts met again in June 1990 in Paris to discuss the testing of specific taggants and to make final recommendations.
- ◆ ICAO has begun a new program to match "donor" nations with those nations informing ICAO that they need aviation security technical assistance. The United States has been matched with seven nations. FAA will take the lead in providing this assistance.

European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

ECAC is an intergovernmental consultative organization established in 1955 at the initiative of the Council of Europe and with the active support of ICAO. ECAC's objectives are to encourage the safe and orderly development of civil aviation to, from, and within Europe. ECAC currently has 23 Member States. In the field of security, ECAC's objective is to ensure the maximum level of security possible, within ECAC and with its partners serving its airports. ECAC Member States apply the ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices. In addition, supplementary measures, appropriate to the conditions pertaining in Europe, are promulgated by ECAC by way of its Security Manual which is kept under constant review.

Recent FAA activities with ECAC in the aviation security area include the following:

- ◆ Senior FAA security representatives attended ECAC conferences on aviation security in Spain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The primary discussions focused on visits to foreign airports by U.S. and foreign assessment teams and the development of more stringent security measures regarding checked baggage.
- ◆ FAA continues to coordinate with ECAC on the provision of aviation security assistance to selected nations, particularly in Africa.

VI. Outlook

The worldwide terrorist threat against civil aviation persists. This was clearly demonstrated in the second half of 1989 by the bombings of two foreign air carrier aircraft, resulting in 278 deaths. Because of its high visibility, civil aviation will remain a tempting target for criminals and terrorists.

Most governments in recent years have increased their efforts to provide a safer and more secure air transportation system. The FAA, in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, has been active in supporting these efforts. FAA assessments of security measures implemented at foreign airports assist foreign airport authorities in improving and maintaining the overall security posture at their international airports. FAA is complementing its assessment program with a growing aviation security technical assistance effort aimed at providing security training and procedural guidance to foreign aviation authorities. Finally, the deployment of additional FAA aviation security personnel overseas will provide greater surveillance and on-site technical expertise to U.S. and foreign air carriers as well as promote and enhance cooperation with host governments.

In the United States, joint initiatives have been undertaken with the airline industry and airport operators to implement improved security measures. Special emphasis has been placed on improved monitoring of security procedures at major U.S. airports. FAA will continue to review, test, and evaluate contingency plans of U.S. airports and air carriers utilizing hijacking scenarios and other exercises. Higher priority and additional resources are being directed toward research and development of equipment for passenger and baggage screening. The FAA is also working with the Air Transport Association to improve the selection, evaluation, and training of security screeners at U.S. airports.

The FAA is strongly committed to a civil aviation security system that provides for the safe, secure, efficient, and reliable movement of people and property.